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NOTES 
The Impact of Michigan's Common-Law Disabilities of Cover-
ture on Married Women's Access to Credit 
In the United States, credit is indispensable to the improvement 
of one's economic status and life style.1 Its availability often dic-
tates •the extent to which one has access to education, homeowner-
ship, entrepreneurship, and investment, 2 and its unobtainability in-
hibits full participation in the activities and opportunities of Ameri-
can society. American women have long been systematically ex-
cluded from equal access to credit by lending institutions of all types3 
and ·thus have been denied their rightful role in the economic life 
of the country. It is only recently, however, that the women's move-
ment has begun to focus attention on credit discrimination4 and that 
the legal6 and financial8 communities, the government, 7 and the gen-
eral public8 have recognized the problems encountered by women 
seeking to obtain credit. 
A number of states, 9 as well as the federal government, 10 have 
responded by enacting laws .to ensure equal credit opportunity. In 
1974, Michigan joined these states by adopting an equal credit op-
portunity act that prohibits discrimination "on the basis of race, color, 
1. See Brown, The Discredited American Woman: Sex Discrimination in Con-
sumer Credit, 6 U. CAL. DAVIS L REv. 61 (1973). 
2. Gates, Credit Discrimination Against Women: C-auses and Solutions, 27 VAND. 
L. REV. 409, 410 (1974). 
3 . .See NATIONAL CoMMISSION ON CoNSUMER FINANCE, REPORT-CONSUMER 
CREI>rr IN nm UNITED STATES 152 (1972) [hereinafter NCCF REPORT]. 
4. See, e.g., K. DECRow, SEXIST JUSTICE 3-139 (1974). 
5. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 1; Gates, supra note 2; Littlefield, Sex-Based Dis-
criminalion and Credit Granting Practices, 5 CoNN. L REv. 575 (1973); Comment, 
Credit Equality for the California Woman?, 3 U. SAN FERN. VALLEY L REv. 125 
(1974). 
6. See, e.g., Women Win More Credit, BUSINESS WEEK, Jan. 12, 1974, at 76:-
7. See, e.g., NCCF REPORT, supra note 3, at 152-53. 
8. See, e.g., Women Battle Bias, TIME, June 4, 1973, at 80; Who Gets the 
Credit?, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 21, 1972, at 69. 
9. See Gates, supra note 2, at 436. 
10. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1691-91e (Supp. Feb. 
1975), makes it "unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant on 
the basis of sex or marital status with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction." 
15 U.S.C.A. § 1691 (Supp. Feb. 1975). It provides for civil liability including puni-
tive damages and sets a maximum recovery of $10,000 in an individual suit and a 
maximum total recovery in a class action of $100,000 or one per cent of the net 
worth of the creditor, whichever is less. 15 U.S.C.A. § 169le (Supp. Feb. 1975), 
These provisions took effect one year from the Oct. 28, 1974, date of enactment. 
15 U.S.C.A. § 1691 note (Supp. Feb. 1975). 
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religion, national origin, marital status, sex or physical handicap" in 
the granting of loans, the extending of credit, or the rating of a per-
son's creditworthiness.11 The statute provides both criminal and 
civil sanctions and ensures a minimum recovery in civil cases of $200 
in addition to court costs and attorney fees. Under this new legis-
lation creditors presumably can no longer, on grounds of sex or mari-
tal status alone, discount a woman's income, force her to seek credit 
in her husband's name, or deny her credit altogether. 
Although laws such as Michigan's should effectively eliminate 
credit limitations based upon sexually discriminatory assumptions 
about the creditworthiness of women, other obstacles impede .the at-
tainment of equal credit opportunity. In a number of states, includ-
ing Michigan, there remain common-law disabilities of coverture that 
limit the capacity of married women to contraot12 and hence their 
ability to obtain credit from lenders understandably hesitant to deal 
with those not legally bound to repay debts. Significantly, -the fed-
eral Equal Credit Opportunity Act permits credit discrimination to 
the extent that state laws limit the ability of married women to con-
tract.18 
11. No. 246, {1974] Mich. Pub. & Local Acts- (codified at MICH. COMP. LAws 
ANN. § 750.147a (Supp. 1975) ). This act provides: 
( 1) A person shall not discriminate in extending credit or granting a loan 
on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, marital status, sex or physi-
cal handicap unless that person: 
(a) Is a non-profit corporation whose members share the same: 
(i) Racial, religious, ethnic, marital or sexual characteristic; 
or 
(ii) Physical handicap; or 
(iii) Blend of these characteristics and 
(b) Extends credit or grants a loan only to its members. 
(2) A person shall not discriminate in the rating of a person's credit 
worthiness on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, marital status, 
sex, or physical handicap. 
(3) A person who violates the provisions of subsections (1) or (2) is 
guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000.00. 
(4) A person who violates the provisions of subsection (1) or (2) shall 
be liable in a civil action to the injured party for the amount of (a) $200.00 
or (b) damages, whichever is greater. Actions brought pursuant to rule 208 of 
the general court rules of 1963 shall be limited to those damages provided in 
subsection (4)(b). The prevailing party in the civil action shall be entitled to 
recover court costs and reasonable attorney fees. The right of action under this 
subsection shall be unassignable. 
12. See L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW 52-59 (1969). 
13. 15 U.S.C.A. § 169ld(b) (Supp. Feb. 1975) ("Consideration or application 
of State property laws directly or indirectly affecting creditworthiness shall not con-
stitute discrimination for purposes of this subchapter"). In its report on the Act, 
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs indicated that "if an 
applicant does not have and control his or her own income or assets which can 
clearly be used as a source of repayment, denial of credit would be based on proper 
credit criteria and the concept of discrimination would be inapplicable." S. REP. No. 
93-278, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1973) (emphasis original). The Committee .added 
that it recognized "that, because of the laws of certain States, creditors or card issuers 
may deem certain women less creditworthy than other women or than men in other-
wise similar circumstances . • . . The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
78 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 74:76 
Although existing disabilities may impair the equal access to 
credit otherwise guaranteed by the federal act, it is not certain what 
their effect wil be under Michigan's new equal credit law. This 
Note will examine the history of Michigan's law of coverture to de-
termine the extent to which contractual disabilities remain. Specif-
ically, consideration will be given to the common law of coverture, 
the changes effected by the Michigan Married Women's Property 
Act, 14 and the impact of the 1963 Michigan constitution. The Note 
will then analyze both the influence of the remaining disabilities 
upon a married woman's access to credit and the effect of the new 
Michigan equal credit act upon those disabilities. 
Under the common law of England a single woman, or f eme sole, 
became known to the law upon her marriage as a feme cover1.1 ri 
During the period of her marriage (or coverture) she lost many of 
her rights to ownership and control of property .16 As Blackstone 
stated, "By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law; 
that is, ·the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended 
during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into 
that of the husband."17 
In Michigan,18 as in all the American common-law states,111 the 
English law of coverture was adopted. As a result, the legal effect 
of marriage upon women in Michigan was profound. 20 A married 
woman "could neither possess nor manage property in her own right. 
• • ."
21 The husband became the owner of all personal property 
either owned by the wife before marriage or acquired by her there-
System shall promulgate regulations to insure non-discriminatory extension of credit 
in the context of our Federal system that gives recognition to each State's system 
of law." Id. at 20. Regulations promulgated under the Act now provide: "Consider-
ation or application of State property laws directly or indirectly affecting credit-
worthiness shall not constitute discrimination for purposes of this Part." 40 Fed. Reg. 
49,308 (1975) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(1) ). 
14. MICH. CoMP. LAWS§§ 557.1-.55 (1970). 
15. Covert means covered, protected, sheltered. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 439 
(rev. 4th ed. 1968). The term feme covert indicates a wife's status vis-a-vis her 
husband. 
lo. Johnston, Ser and Property: The Common Law Tradition, The Law School 
Curriculum, and Developments Toward Equality, 41 N.Y.U. L. RBv. 1033, 1045-46 
(1972). 
17. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442. 
18. Stout v. Keyes, 2 Doug. 184, 188-89 (Mich. 1845). 
19. Johnston, supra note 16, at 1058. 
20. The two leading Michigan cases on the common law of coverture are Burdeno 
v. Amperse, 14 Mich. 90 (1866), and Tong v. Marvin, 15 Mich. 60 (1866). Al-
though both construed the law as it existed following the 1855 Married Women's Act, 
their complete outlines of the legal effecls of marriage on women before the Act have 
been cited as authoritative statemen~ of the Michigan common law of coverture. See, 
e.g., Sierra v. Minnear, 341 Mich. 182, 185, 67 N.W.2d 115, 116 (1954). 
21. Burdeno v. Amperse, 14 Mich. 90, 92 (1866). 
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after.22 He had the right to reduce her choses in action to posses-
sion, 28 to possess and control her real property and all her earnings, 24 
and, if children were born, to retain a life estate in all of her real 
property. 25 The wife had no power to contract, to sue, or even to 
be sued in her own name. 26 "In short," as the Michigan supreme 
court stated, "she lost entirely all the legal incidents attaching to a 
person acting in her own right. The husband alone remained sui 
juris, as fully as before marriage."27 
In 1839, states began to make statutory changes in the common 
law of coverture to grant married women increased legal rights. 28 
These acts, which eventually became law in all states, were not, how-
ever, part of a coherent program to abolish the law of coverture 
and grant equal rights to married women. Even minor changes in 
the law of coverture were effected only after overcoming consider-
able legislative resistance. 29 As a result, reform legislation was en-
acted in a piecemeal fashion over a number of years.80 
The history of the law of coverture in Michigan reflects a similar 
pattern. The Married Women's Property Act, which remains in ef-
fect today, is in fact a series of three statutes enacted in 1855,81 
22. Tong v. Marvin, 15 Mich. 60, 66 (1866). 
23. Tong v. Marvin, 15 Mich. 60, 66 (1866). Although a chose in action did 
not become the husband's arid would revert to the wife at the end of the marriage, 
the husband had the right to sue before the end of the marriage to reduce the chose 
in action to possession. He was not accountable to his wife for property thus re-
ceived. See Johnston, supra note 16, at 1045, n.34. 
24. Tong v. Marvin, 15 Mich. 60, 66 (1866). 
25. Tong v. Marvin, 15 Mich. 60, 66 (1866). Upon marriage the husband ob-
tained an interest, known as jure uxoris, in his wife's real property. Although the 
wife did regain the property at the end of the marriage and the husband could not 
alienate the property, the husband did not have to account to the wife for the rents 
and profits derived from the property during the marriage. The husband's interest 
in the property was alienable and subject to attachment by creditors. Any real prop-
erty transferred to the wife after marriage became subject to jure uxoris. See Johns-
ton, supra note 16, at 1045. 
26. Burdeno v. Amperse, 14 Mich. 90, 92 (1866). 
27. Burdeno v. Amperse, 14 Mich. 90, 92 (1866). 
28. Mississippi was the first state to enact a married women's statute. See gen-
erally Note, Husband and Wife-Memorandum on the Mississippi Woman's Law of 
1839, 42 MICH. L. RE.v. 1110 (1944). New York's initial married women's statute, 
enacted in 1848, was the first such law to gain widespread attention. See Johnston, 
supra note 16, at 1064. 
29. See Johnston, supra note 16, at 1063-67. Johnston describes the resistance 
with which New York legislators met each proposal for change. It took years for 
legislators to abandon attitudes similar to those held by the New York lawmaker who 
quoted Thomas Jefferson's remark "that it was owing to the separate interest of wife 
and husband in France that about half the annual increase of the population of Paris 
was illegitimate." Id. at 1064. 
30. Id. at 1061-62. In addition, the states progxessed at different rates in grant-
ing rights to women. Id. Connecticut, for example, did not grant to married women 
the right to control their own property until 1877,. almost 30 years after New York 
had done so. Id. at 1068. 
31. No. 168, {1S55] Mich. Acts. 420. The first married women's act in Michi-
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1911,32 and 1917.33 Each statute eliminated some of the disabilities 
of coverture by granting to married women limited legal rights. The 
Married Women's Act of 1855 was the broadest grant of rights and 
had the most significant effect on the ability of married women to 
contract. The Act permitted a married woman to hold property in 
her own name, prohibited its attachment for her husband's debts, 
and allowed her to transfer her property.8 i In addition, it author-
ized a married woman to contract with relation to her separate es-
tate. 35 The statute thus effected an important change in the legal 
status of a married woman by permitting her to accumulate and re-
tain an estate separate from that of her husband and to contract with 
relation to it. All of the legal rights established by the Act, however, 
dealt specifically with a married woman's separate estate. It granted 
a married woman the right to hold property separately and only such 
additional rights as were necessary to keep her separate property 
free from her husband's creditors. 36 Thus, rather than grant equal-
gan, passed in 1844, was absorbed into the 1855 statute, The 1844 statute, "An Act 
To Defin!! and Protect the Rights of Married Women," provided that 
any estate, real or personal, which may have been acquired by any female before 
her marriage, either by her own personal industry or by inheritance, gift, grant 
or devise, or to which she may at any time hereafter be entitled by inheritance, 
gift, grant, or devise, and the rents, issues, profits and income thereof, shall be 
and continue the real and personal estate of such female after marriage to the 
same extent as before marriage, and none of said property shall be liable for 
her husband's debts or engagements, but such property shall be liable for all the 
debts of the wife contracted prior to marriage. 
No. 66, (1844] Mich. Acts. 77. 
32. No. 196, (1911] Mich. Pub. Acts 330. 
33. No. 158, ,[1917] Mich. Pub. Acts. 287. 
34. MICH. COMP. LAws § 557.1 (1970): 
ff]he real and personal estate of every female acquired before marriage, and 
all property, real and personal, to which she may afterwards become entitled, 
by gift, grant, inheritance, devise, or in any other manner, shall be and remain 
the estate and property of such female, and shall not be liable for the debts, 
obligations and engagements of her husband, and may be contracted, sold, trans· 
ferred, mortgaged, conveyed, devised or bequeathed by her, in the same manner 
and with the like effect as if she were unmarried. 
Section 2 of the Act allows a person holding property as trustee for a married 
woman to convey the property to the woman's separate estate. MICH. COMP. L\ws 
§ 557.2 (1970). Under the common law, one method through which married women 
could prevent their husbands from getting control over their property was by placing 
it in trust. Johnston, supra note 16, at 1052-53. Thus, this section allows the trustee 
to convey property baok to the married woman. 
35. MICH. CoMP. L\ws § 557.4 (1970): 
The husband of any married woman shall not be liable to be sued upon any 
contract made by such married woman in relation to her sole property, and the 
wife shall be liable to be sued upon any contradt or engagement made by her 
in cases where her husband is not in law liable, or where he refuses to perform 
such contract or engagement, and in any case herein authorized, the cause of 
action shall be deemed to have acurred [accrued] from and after the passage 
of this act. 
36. At the same time, there was concern over the possibility of defrauding cred-
itors by placing the husband's property in the wife's separate estate, Therefore, in 
order to retain her separate interest in property, a married woman was required to 
avoid commingling it with that of her husband. See Glover v. Alcott, 11 Mich, 470, 
479 (1863). 
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ity, the Act sought to protect a married woman's property from pre-
dation by her husband. 
In accord with the Act's purpose, the contractual powers it 
granted37 were limited to agreements directly relating to a married 
woman's separate estate.38 In interpreting the effect of the 1855 
statute, the Michigan supreme court emphasized that a married 
woman has "no general capacity to contract. She can only make 
such contracts as relate to her own property, while in regard to that 
she has very full powers."89 Kenton Insurance Co. v. McClellan40 
illustrates -the limited powers that the Act granted. The case was 
brought against a married woman on a promissory note that she had 
given to her son to use as security for one of his debts. The court, 
upholding the woman's defense that the contract did not relate to 
her separate estate, stated: "It has been uniformly held by this 
court that our statutes do not authorize a married woman to become 
personally liable on an executory promise except concerning her sep-
arate estate. A note given for any other consideration is void."41 
The Michigan court recognized three ways in which a contract 
may relate to a married woman's separate estate. The primary way 
was if the contractual consideration went directly to her separate 
estate. 42 This represented the most significant expansion of married 
women's contractual rights and provided the foundation for married 
women to obtain property for themselves on their own credit. A 
contract was also found to relate to a married woman's separate es-
tate if she had agreed to pay for services, such as medical treatment, 
from which she derived a personal benefit. 48 The final way in which 
a married woman was permitted to contract was for services ren-
dered to a person for whom she was legally responsible when such 
services were required by the scope of her responsibility. Thus, a 
married woman could contract with a doctor to provide medical care 
to her children.44 Under a strict construction of the 1855 Act, these 
last two types of contracts would not seem to relate to a married 
woman's separate estate since they have no real effect on her prop-
erty. Although the Michigan court did not articulate the basis of 
its expansive interpretation of the phrase "separate estate," it seems 
37. MICH. CoMP. LAws § 557.4 (1970), quoted in note 35 supra. 
38. See Florer, The Contracts of Married Women in Michigan, 4 MICH. ST. B.J. 
*99, *103 (1925). 
39. West v. Laraway, 28 Mich. 464,465 (1874). 
40. 43 Mich. 564, 6 N.W. 88 (1880). 
41. 43 Mich. at 565, 6 N.W. at 88. 
42. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Parent, 152 Mich. 587, 116 N.W. 367 (1908); Tillman 
v. Shaokleton, 15 Mich. 447 (1~67) (married woman held liable for purchase of fur-
niture to be used by her in running her own business). 
43. See, e.g., Barber v. Eberle's Estate, 131 Mich. 317, 91 N.W. 123 (1902). 
44. See, e.g., Goodman v. Shipley, 105 Mich. 439, 63 N.W. 412 (1895). 
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reasonable 10 conclude that the court was motivated by practical con-
siderations. It was able to extend to married women additional 
useful rights without altering the protective nature of the Act. 
Only in these three specific areas were married women permit-
ted to contract by the 1855 Act. The Michigan supreme court 
stressed that the "statute has not removed all the common-law dis-
abilities of a married woman. It has not made her sui juris, or con-
ferred upon her the powers of a f eme sole, except in certain direc-
tions."45 The court was careful in its interpretation of the Act to 
avoid holding a married woman liable on a contract not for her bene-
fit. Thus, in Buck v. Haynes Estate,46 the promise of a married 
woman to pay for medical services rendered to her husband was held 
not to be binding on the grounds that the debt was her husband's 
and that she did not have the legal capacity to assume the debt with-
out some consideration running to her separate estate. 47 Even when 
there was consideration running to the married woman's separate es-
tate, the court would not hold her liable unless she had personally 
agreed to the arrangement. Therefore, in Detroit Lumber Co. v. 
Cleff,48 the court held that a wife was not, upon her husband's insol-
vency, liable for improvements to her property contracted for by her 
husband. The court viewed the statute not as emancipatory, but 
rather as strictly protective and interpreted the act as granting to a 
married woman a shield with which to avoid liability for the debts 
of others, particularly her husband's. This attitude is clearly demon-
strated by the court's rejection, in Artman v. Ferguson,40 of a part-
nership between a wife and her husband. The court stated: 
[I]t is the purpose of these statutes to secure to a married woman the 
right to acquire and hold property separate from her husband, and 
free from his influence and control, and if she might enter into a busi-
ness partnership with her husband it would subject her property to his 
control in a manner wholly inconsistent with the separation which it 
is the purpose of the statute to secure, and might subject her to an in-
definite liability for his engagements. 60 
It is apparent that the court believed the Act protected a married 
45. Howe v. North, 69 Mich. 272, 284, 37 N.W. 213, 219 ( 1888). 
46. 75 Mich. 397, 42 N.W. 949 (1889). 
47. Compare text at note 44 supra. One significant exception to the Buck rule 
was that a married woman could make an express charge on her own property by 
mortgaging it to secure the payment of another's obligation since the 1855 Act au-
thorized her to sell or mortgage her property. MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 557.1 (1970), 
quoted in note 34 supra. See, e.g., Marx v. Belle!, 114 Mich. 631, 72 N.W. 620 
(1897), where a creditor was allowed to foreclose on the mortgage of a piano belong-
ing to a married woman who had encumbered it to secure her husband's business 
debts. 
48. 164 Mich. 276, 128 N.W. 231 (1910). See also Lesher v. Brosteau, 238 
Mich. 189, 197, 213 N.W. 163, 166 (1927). 
49. 73 Mich. 146, 40 N.W. 907 (1888). 
50. 73 Mich. at 150, 40 N.W. at 909. 
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woman by allowing her to contract only with regard to her separate 
estate. Thus, in the court's view, it was for the benefit of a married 
woman that "[i]n all other respects she is a femme-covert, and sub-
ject to all the restraints and disabilities consequent upon that rela-
tion."51 
The Michigan court, in furtherance of its protectivist interpreta-
tion of the Act, also imposed procedural burdens upon any party 
seeking to enforce a contract against a married woman. It required 
affirmative proof by a plaintiff that the consideration went to the 
married woman's separate estate. 52 Emphasizing that "there is 
never any presumption of validity of such an undertaking, whether 
negotiable or not, and that proof must always be given of such a con-
sideration as will bind her," the court stated, "We think the rule must 
apply whether value received is expressed or not, because -the power 
is not general but statutory, and cannot be extended beyond the con-
stitutional and statutory limits."118 
In Fechheimer v. Peirce,54 the plaintiff sued a married woman 
on a note that, it was alleged, she had signed as principal and her 
husband had signed as surety. The husband had filled out the loan 
application and picked up the check, which was made out to the 
wife. When sued, the wife denied knowledge of the loan. The 
court concluded that the fact that the check was made payable to 
the wife's order, when delivered to the husband without her author-
ity, "was not very significant" and, as a matter of law, "amounted 
to no proof of a loan to her."55 By thus placing such a heavy burden 
of proof upon the plaintiff, the court reaffirmed its analysis of the 
1855 Act as a protective measure. 56 
The limited rights granted to married women by the 1855 Act 
were thus narrowly interpreted by the Michigan court. Where the 
Act did not apply, the common-law rule that a contract made by 
a married woman was void57 continued in force.58 Thus, a married 
woman could neither sue nor be sued on a contract beyond the scope 
51. 73 Mich. at 148-49, 40 N.W. at 908. 
52. See West v. Laraway, 28 Mich. 464,467 (1879). 
53 .. Kenton Ins. Co. v. McClellan, 43 Mich. 564,565, 6 N.W. 88, 88 (1880). 
54. 70 Mich. 440, 38 N.W. 325 (1888). 
55. 70 Mich. at 442, 38 N.W. at 326. 
56. Although Fechheimer was seemingly disregarded in National Lumberman's 
Bank v. Miller, 131 Mich. 564, 91 N.W. 1024 (1902), the Michigan court reaf-
firmed it in Judd v. Judd, 187 Mich. 612, 154 N.W. 31 (1915), and, more recently, 
in Koengeter v. Holzbaugh, 332 Mich. 280, 50 N.W.2d 778 (1952) and Montz v. 
Reuter, 268 Mich. 357,256 N.W. 351 (1934). 
57. See Note, Contracts-Liability of Married Woman on Promissory Note, 5 
MICH. ST. B.J. *125 (1926). 
58. See Judd v. Judd, 187 Mich. 612, 615, 154 N.W. 31, 32 (1915). See gener-
ally Koengeter v. Holzbaugh, 332 Mich. 280, 50 N.W.2d 778 (1952); Florer, supra 
note 38, at * 11 I; VanSyckle, Some Phases of the Michigan Law Relating to Husband 
and Wife, l DBT. L. REV. 13, 17 (1931). 
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of the 1855 Act,59 even if the contract were a negotiable instrument 
in the possession of a holder in due course. 60 
One of the many disabilities of coverture left unaffected by the 
1855 Act was the common-law right of the husband to his wife's 
services. Since the husband possessed the right to her wages, the 
wife had no right to sue for her earnings or make an enforceable 
contract for employment and therefore continued to be subject to 
the economic control of her husband.61 In 1911 the Michigan su-
preme court granted an injunction sought by a husband to prevent 
his wife from operating a business in competition with him. 02 The 
court held: "The husband, being of sufficient ability, is bound in 
law to afford to his wife support reasonably consistent with his own 
means and station. As a necessary corollary to this proposition, it 
follows that the husband as a matter of law is entitled to the services 
and society of his wife. This right has been affirmed many times 
in our own State."63 
Apparently in reaction to this holding, the Michigan legislature 
passed the 1911 Act, which granted married women the right to con-
tract and sue on their own behalf to obtain their earnings. 04 This 
law thus freed a married woman from the control of her husband 
in the area of employment, and she became "entitled to all her earn-
ings resulting from her personal efforts."0u It was not long, how-
59. See Howe v. North, 69 Mich. 272, 37 N.W. 213 (1888). But see Showman 
v. Lee, 79 Mich. 653, 658, 44 N.W. 1061, 1063 (1891). The Michigan court has 
held, however, that if a married woman neglects to assert the defense in a suit against 
her "and suffers the case to go on to judgment against her, and still more, suffers 
the judgment to stand, the circumstance that she was not originally bound will not 
suffice to render the judgment void." Wilson v. Coolidge, 42 Mich. 112, 114, 3 N.W. 
285, 287 (1879). 
60. See Johnson v. Sutherland, 39 Mich. 579 (1878). This rule was continued 
under UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-305(b), MICH. COMP. LA.ws § 440.3305 
(1970), which provides: ''To the extent that a holder is a holder in due course he 
takes the instrument free from .•• (2) all defenses of any party to the instrument 
with whom the holder has not dealt except ... (b) such other incapacity, or duress, 
or illegality of the transaction, as renders the obligation of the party a nullity." 
Comment 5 to this section indicates, "If under the local law the effect is to render 
the obligation of the instrument entirely null and void, the defense may be asserted 
against a holder in due course. If the effect is merely to render the obligation void-
able at the election of the obliger, the defense is cut off." 
61. Glover v. Alcott, 11 Mich. 470 (1863). See In re Mayer's Estate, 210 Mich. 
188, 191, 177 N.W. 488, 489 (1920). 
62. Root v. Root, 164 Mich. 638, 130 N.W. 194 (1911). 
63. 164 Mich. at 645, 130 N.W. at 196. 
64. MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 557.ll (1970) provides: 
Each and every married woman in the state of Michigan shall be absolutely en-
titled to have, hold, own, retain and enjoy any and all earnings acquired by any 
such married woman as the result of her personal efforts; and to sell or other-
wise dispose of any and all such earnings, and to make contracts in relation 
thereto to the same extent that any such married woman could have or do if 
unmarried. 
See In re Mayer's Estate, 210 Mich. 188, 177 N.W. 488 (1920). 
65. In re Snow's Estate, 321 Mich. 127, 130, 32 N.W.2d 364, 365 (1948). 
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ever, before the Michigan supreme court imposed a significant limi-
tation upon the right of a married woman to her earnings. In Greg-
ory v. Oakland Motor Car Co., 66 a husband sued for the loss of his 
wife's domestic services as a result of an accident allegedly caused 
by the defendant's employee. The court disagreed with the defend-
ant's assertion that the 1911 statute barred a husband's recovery for 
his wife's services and held: 
[T]he statute means that all earnings acquired or service performed 
by her as the result of her personal efforts in any separate business 
carried on by her in her own behalf, or any services performed by her 
for others than her husband, belong to her; but that her husband is 
entitled to her labor, companionship, society, and assistance in dis-
charge of those duties and obligations which arise out of the marriage 
relation, and that these belong to him. 67 
The court, evidently concerned about disrupting the traditional struc-
ture of the marital relation, insisted that the 1911 statute did not 
intend to put a married woman's "domestic duties and labor, per-
formed in and around her home for her family, upon a pecuniary 
basis, nor . . . to classify such duties as services, nor to permit her 
to recover damages for loss of ability to perform them."68 Since the 
wife's services in the home are the traditional quid pro quo of the 
husband's duty of support, granting her the right to earnings for her 
domestic services would have resulted in a major change in the law 
of domestic relations and a much broader change in the status of 
women than the court was willing to espouse. Although the court 
sought to protect a married woman's separate property from her hus-
band, it was not prepared to effect legal reforms that would threaten 
her traditional role as housekeeper. Thus, the court's interpretation 
of the 1911 Act once again emphasized the protective, rather than 
emancipatory, nature of Michigan's married women's property legis-
lation. 
The last of the three statutes that constitute the Michigan Mar-
ried Women's Property Act was enacted in 1917 to expand a wife's 
power to contract jointly with her husband. Although under the 
1855 Act a married woman could contract jointly with her husband 
if the consideration went solely to her separate estate/19 she could 
not be held liable on a contract if the consideration went either to 
her husband's separate estate70 or to their joint estate.71 Thus in 
66. 181 Mich. 101, 147 N.W. 614 (1914). 
67. 181 Mich. at 110, 147 N.W. at 617. 
68. Blair v. Seitner Dry Goods Co., 184 Mich. 304, 313, 151 N.W. 724, 727 
(1915). 
69. Kies v. Walworth, 250 Mich. 34,229 N.W. 519 (1930). 
70. Fisk v. Mills, 104 Mich. 433, 62 N.W. 559 (1895); Littlefield v. Dingwall, 
71 Mich. 223, 39 N.W. 38 (1888). 
71. See Jarzembinski v. Plodowski, 225 Mich. 104, 195 N.W. 681 (1923) (wife 
held not liable on a note for payment on a house jointly owned); Schlatterer v. Nick-
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Caldwell v. Jones, 12 the court, stating that "[i]t is not enough, to 
charge a married woman upon her executory contract, that there is 
consideration which would support a promise at the common law, 
or that the contract indirectly inures to her benefit,"73 held that a 
woman could not be liable on a joint note that she and her husband 
had given for a horse owned by them jointly. The 1917 Act enabled 
a married woman to become liable on such joint contracts with her 
husband to the extent of their joint estate even though the consider-
ation did not run solely to her separate estate. u The Act, however, 
odemus, 51 Mich. 628, 17 N.W. 210 (1883) (promissory note given for judgment 
against husband and wife jointly held to be invalid as to the wife). 
72. 115 Mich. 129, 73 N.W. 129 (1897). 
73. 115 Mich. at 130, 73 N.W. at 129. 
74. MICH. CoMP. LAws §§ 557.51-.55 (1970) provides: 
. . . Sec. 1. The common law disability of married women to make and 
enter into the class or kind of contracts hereinafter specified in section 2, is 
hereby abrogated and abolished. 
. . . Sec. 2. Hereafter married women shall be possessed of the power and 
capacity, and it shall be competent for them to bind and makes [make] them• 
selves jointly liable with their husbands upon any written instrument as herein-
after provided. Said liability to extend, however, only to the property described 
in the following section . 
• . . Sec. 3. Hereafter the real estate of the husband and wife owned by 
them as tenants by entirety, or the real estate acquired by either as survivor of 
the other, or in the event of divorce the interest of either in real estate which 
was previously owned by them as tenants by the entirety, shall be liable to 
seizure and sale on execution, and all personal property and choses in action 
owned by husband and wife jointly with right of survivorship therein, shall be 
subject to writ of garnishment and all other process provided by law, in satisfac-
tion of any judgment which has been recovered against the persons who were 
at the time of the execution of such written instrument husband and wife jointly 
or the survivor upon any instrument signed by both. In case the wife is the 
survivor, or in case the husband and wife have been divorced prior to the recov-
ery of the judgment, a judgment against the wife may be satisfied only out of 
such property. 
• • . Sec. 4. Such judgment or decree shall be enforced in all respects as 
now provided by law, except this, that in all cases where such liability is sought 
to be enforced as against the real estate of the husband and wife owned by them 
jointly as tenants by entirety or the crops, rents, profits or proceeds thereof or 
taken therefrom, or any personal property or choses in action owned by the hus-
band and wife jointly with right of survivorship therein, the judgment or decree 
shall recite and it shall be the duty of the court to determine in such suit or 
proceeding whether such judgment or decree is rendered upon any written instru-
ment and whether the parties defendant in such suit or proceeding and against 
whom such judgment or decree is rendered, were at the date of delivery of such 
instrument husband and wife, naming them, which recital of fact for the 
guidance of the officer shall be endorsed upon any writ of execution or other 
process issued thereon or for the collection thereof, which recital shall be con-
clusive as against the husband and wife and authorize the enforcement of such 
judgment or decree as against all property subject to the satisfaction thereof by 
virtue of this act. 
. . . Sec. 5. The provisions of this act shall not be construed to apply to 
any property otherwise exempted under the constitution or laws of this state. 
(Footnote omitted.) 
Interpreting the Act, the Michigan supreme court has held that no special form 
of consideration is necessary, Rossman v. Hutchinson, 289 Mich. 577, 286 N.W. 835 
(1939), nor is it necessary for a creditor to proceed against the husband's separate 
estate before proceeding against the joint estate. Binne v. Bench, 302 Mich, 327, 
4 N.W.2d 674 (1942). 
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also limited this newly granted right. It required that her liability 
could only be founded "upon a written instrument, [and could ex-
tend] only to joint and entirety property, enforceable under a judg-
ment reciting that such parties were husband and wife at the time 
of their execution and delivery of such instrument . . . ."75 The 
statute thus fulfilled the dual purposes of allowing creditors to levy 
upon jointly held property and protecting the married woman's sepa-
rate estate. 76 
The effect of the three married women's statutes was thus to al-
low a married woman to contract: (1) in relation to her sole and 
separate estate; (2) in relation to her earnings for services rendered 
outside the home; and (3) jointly with her husband to the extent 
of their joint estate. 77 Because a married woman's ability to con-
tract was "solely the product of statutory sanction,"78 the common 
law remained in effect, and married women were legally disabled 
from making enforceable contracts in those areas not covered by the 
statutes of 1855, 1911, and 1917. It is clear that the statutes did 
not abolish all the disabilities of coverture. 79 They were not de-
signed to give married women complete contractual equality with 
men and single women, but rather to protect their separate estates. 
No further changes in the law of married women's contractual 
rights were effected for over forty-five years despite the recognition 
by at least some segments of the legal community that the imposition 
of contractual disabilities was no longer supported by public policy 
considerations. As one early commentator stated: 
It seems needless ,to suggest that the wife should be given the 
same power to bind herself by contract that the husband enjoys. Her 
common-law immunity from liability on her promises was never re-
garded as a privilege or protection, but rather as the natural conse-
quence of total incapacity. The wife neither needs nor desires priv-
ilege or protection today. To restrict her power to contract on either 
theory is hardly consistent with modem standards. 80 
75. United States v. O'Hara, 46 F. Supp. 780, 782 (E.D. Mich. 1942). 
76. The Act originally required the inclusion in the joint contract of a clause in 
which the wife acknowledged that she was freely entering into the agreement without 
duress. This provision was eliminated in 1929. No. 287, [1929] Mich. Pub. Acts 
746. 
77. See Vansyckle, supra note 58, at 17. 
78. Honigman, Tenancy by Entirety in Michigan, 5 MICH. ST. B.J. *249, *268 
(1926). 
79. See Sierra v. Minnear, 341 Mich. 182, 67 N.W.2d 115 (1954); Gillespie v. 
Beecher, 94 Mich. 374, 54 N.W. 167 (1892). Cf. Florer, supra note 38, at *99: 
"In the general attitude toward the rights and liabilities of married women under their 
contracts in Michigan today it is a common assumption that their common law dis-
abilities are almost, if not entirely, removed by statute. • . • It would be only a nat-
ural assumption that married women in Michigan have been relieved of their disabil-
ities in the field of contracts. Such is not the case." 
80. 3 C. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS§ 152, at 36 (1935). 
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In this regard, Michigan lagged far behind the rest of the states, most 
of which had long before granted to married women contractual 
powers equivalent to those of men and single women. 81 AB a result, 
into the 1960's married women in Michigan remained legally unable 
to exercise full contractual powers. 
In 1961 Michigan convened a constitutional convention to re-
draft the entire state constitution. 82 Among the proposed changes 
to the 1908 constitution that were considered at length were two pro-
visions of great significance to the rights of married women. The 
first of these was a proposal to add an equal protection clause to 
the constitution and to include sex among the prohibited bases of 
classification. 83 Although an equal protection clause was eventually 
approved by the convention, classification on the basis of sex was 
not among its prohibitions. 84 The second proposal was to amend 
the married women's property provision of the 1908 constitution. 
The provision, finally approved by the convention as article 10, sec-
.tion 1, of the 1963 constitution, did change the existing constitution's 
provision by adding the phrase: "The disabilities of coverture as to 
property are abolished."85 However, because of the ambiguity of this 
phrase, 86 it is necessary to examine the legislative history to ascertain 
its intended effect on married women's rights. 
Although Proposal 26-the proposal to include sex among the 
prohibited bases of classification in the equal protection clause-was 
not approved by the constitutional convention, the history of its con-
sideration provides valuable insight into the concerns and attitudes 
of the convention's delegates on the issue of women's rights. Upon 
its introduction, the proposal met with opposition from a number of 
81. As of 1969, only ten other states placed limitations on married women's con-
tractual capacities. See L. KANowrrz, supra note 12, at 55. 
82. See OFFICIAL RECORD OF nm 1961 MICHIGAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
[hereinafter CoNsnnmONAL CONVENTION]. 
83. Committee Proposal 26 read: "No person shall be denied the equal protec-
tion of the laws; nor shall any person be denied the enjoyment of his civil or politi-
cal rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of race, religion, 
sex or national origin. The legislature shall implement this section by appropriate 
legislation." Id. at 2887-88. 
84. See MICH. CoNST. art. 1, § 2. 
85. The entire section reads: 
The disabilities of coverture as to property are abolished. The real and personal 
estate of every woman acquired before marriage and all real and personal prop-
erty to which she may afterwards become entitled shall be and remain the estate 
and property of such woman, and shall not be liable for the debts, obligations 
or engagements of her husband, and may be dealt with and disposed of by her 
as if she were unmarried. Dower may be relinquished or conveyed as provided 
by law. 
The first and last sentences are new to the 1963 constitution; otherwise the language 
is essentially the same as article 16, section 8, of the 1908 constitution. 
86. See Nord, The Michigan Constitution of 1963, 10 WAYNE L. RBv. 309, 361 
(1964). 
November 1975] Married Women's Credit 89 
delegates who feared the abolition of protective legislation. Dele-
gate Katherine Cushman, a leader of this opposition, stated: 
[W]hen sex is coupled so closely to this area where we know almost 
absolutely that all classification is illegal, the result must be to thrust 
on the courts the proposition that the convention intended all classifi-
cation with respect to sex, no matter how reasonable it may appear to 
be, to be unconstitutional under Michigan Supreme Law. The result 
might well be to damage or destroy the capacity of the legislature to 
enact protective legislation for women, and it would imperil the con-
stitutionality of legislation already on the books. 87 
Another opponent, Delegate Dorothy Judd, added: "Being women, 
we want equality with men, but also want our special privileges 
too."88 The proposal's supporters did not respond by defending the 
need for sexual equality, but by asserting that the proposal would 
accommodate "reasonable" sex-based classifications and that there-
fore the mere inclusion of the word sex in the equal protection clause 
would not prevent the enactment of all protective legislation. 89 On 
this basis, the proposal's advocates were able to garner sufficient sup-
port to enable it to pass its first reading. 90 
By the time of its second reading, however, the women who had 
originally opposed Proposal 26 had gained the support of a sufficient 
number of male delegates to block reapproval of the original pro-
posal. Delegate William Ford stated: "[T]here are numerous rea-
sons why this is one form of discrimination that should be continued 
in the form in which it has evolved over a period of time and that 
we are ta1dng a risk here with no positive suggestion, by anyone that 
I have heard, of the benefits to be derived that would outweigh the 
possible harm that might result."91 Remarks such as these clearly 
indicate the general satisfaction of the proposal's opponents with so-
ciety's extant sex-based discrimination and their great reluctance to 
move, even incrementally, toward equality. 
In response to this opposition, the supporters of the proposal 
stressed their belief that the law should permit sex-based classifica-
tions. As Delegate Ann Donnelly commented: "[T]o take a quote 
that was given me from Oliver Wendell Holmes, he stated that it 
would take more than the nineteenth amendment to convince him 
that there was no difference between men and women. I think 
the courts and everybody else can take judicial notice of a few 
facts. "92 To ensure her interpretation, Delegate Donnelly intro-
duced, and the convention adopted, an amendment to the proposal 
87. CoNSTITUTIONAL CoNVBNTION, supra note 82, at 2888. 
88. Id. at 2888. 
89. See, e.g., id. at 2889 (remarks of Delegate Harold Norris). 
90. Id. at 2891. 
91. Id. at 2912. 
92. Id. at 2913. 
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that added: "This shall not be construed to prevent reasonable clas-
sification for the protection of women."93 
Despite the acceptance of the amended proposal, a number of 
delegates sought to block any inclusion of the word sex in the equal 
protection clause. Delegate William Cudlip quoted a letter from 
Professor Paul Kauper of The University of Michigan Law School: 
I feel that to include sex along with race, religion and national origin 
as an impermissible basis for discrimination in the enjoyment or ex-
ercise of civil or political rights would be a mistake. I say this not be-
cause I think a legislature should be free to subject women to discrim-
inatory laws in the enjoyment of political and civil rights but because 
the use of the word sex in the context of the equal protection provi-
sion, along with race, religion and national origin suggests on its face 
that sex cannot be made a basis for legislative classification. 
. . . [Although the inclusion of the Donnelly amendment] would 
help to meet the problem of classification, . . . it would be directed 
only to the end of permitting protective police legislation and thus 
would deal with only a part of the problem of classification by sex. 94 
Delegate Cudlip amplified on the reasoning implicit in Professor 
Kauper's analysis: "Women need to be discriminated against for 
their benefit many, many times. The whole point here is that this 
language, as developed, does not go far enough to protect them un-
der many, many situations arising because of the differences of na-
ture."95 The supporters of Proposal 26, rather than responding to 
the argument that women need to be discriminated against, 00 reiter-
ated that the proposal was not intended to grant women equal rights. 
As Delegate Lillian Hatcher, one of the proposal's strongest backers, 
stated: 
[T]here are those who seem to think that this language will remove 
the rights of women. . . . We are not saying equal rights. We're 
saying equal protection of the rights we have. And there's a sea of 
difference between equal rights and equal protection. I am opposed 
to the equal rights amendment, as such, as the women on the hill 
have been fighting for a number of years. But I am in favor of equal 
protection because even ·though I'm not an attorney, I know that 
there's a big difference between men and women. 97 
Despite this response, the proposal's opponents were able to per-
suade a significant majority of the delegates that it was necessary 
93. Id. at 2915. 
94. Id. at 3089. 
95. Id. at 3089. 
96. But see id. at 3092 (statement of Ann Donnelly): "I am very, very, very 
mindful of the discrimination against women. I have found no discrimination for 
women-or against them-for their protection yet. I think the underlying motive 
behind this is not to protect women. . . . I don't think they [the amendments to 
strike] will protect women. I think they aid in discrimination against them." 
91. Id. at 3090 (laughter deleted). 
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to permit not only protective legislation, but all legislation discrimi-
nating against women for their benefit. Thus, the word sex was 
ultimately eliminated from the equal protection clause. 98 This legis-
lative history indicates unequivocally that the delegates to the con-
vention cast their votes for protection and not for equality. Even 
the minority that supported Proposal 26 did not seek to grant mar-
ried women equal rights. Instead of making progress in the area 
of women's rights, the convention thus explicitly approved the exist-
ing legal status of Michigan women. 99 
The attitudes and beliefs expressed in the debate on the equal 
protection provision provide an appropriate background for an analy-
sis of the deliberations of the constitutional convention on the 
women's property provision. The debate on the women's property 
provision was conducted at four general stages. Initially, language 
was added to the 1908 provision to broaden its scope considerably. 
The convention then considered but rejected a move to delete the 
constitutional provision entirely. Next, the convention reinstated the 
language of the 1908 constitution. Finally, the convention adopted 
a more restrictive version of the initial amended proposal. The re-
sult of this vacillation was the enactment of a provision that did no 
more than constitutionalize the existing Married Women's Property 
Act. 
Although the original proposal presented to the convention re-
tained the language of article 16, section 8, of the 1908 constitu-
tion, 100 it was amended immediately upon reaching the floor of the 
convention. The amendment proposed to make the language of the 
provision correspond with section 1 of the 1855 Married Women's 
Act101 and added the words: "The disabilities of coverture are abol-
ished."102 Despite its potentially far-reaching implications, this pro-
vision, at least initially, received little attention.103 Rather, the new 
proposal's sponsors concentrated on the need to incorporate the pro-
tections of the married women's acts into the constitution to ensure 
98. Id. at 30!>2. The final vote on the motion to strike was 82 to 48. Id. 
99. In contrast, the convention record shows great concern on the part of dele-
gates for the problems of racial discrimination. The convention members ex-
pressed pride in their adoption of a proposal that they hoped would contribute to the 
goal of racial equality. See, e.g., id. at 3088-89 (statement of William Cudlip). It 
is clear that the women's movement had not made a similar impact on the conven-
tion. 
100. See note 85 supra. 
101. MICH. COMP. LAws § 557.1 (1970), quoted in note 34 supra. 
102. CoNSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 82, at 2437. 
103. If all the disabilities of coverture were abolished, it is clear that much more 
than property rights would be affected and that the constitution would go far beyond 
the existing law. It is unclear from the record why these implications were not dis-
cussed at this juncture. As shall be seen, when the potential impact of the phrase 
was later realized, the convention was quiok to modify it See note 117 and text 
at notes 117-19 infra. 
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married women the right to deal with their own property.104 They 
argued that the amended proposal was necessary because "[t]he 
married woman's statute is further extended than [the] present con-
stitutional language."105 
Upon the initial adoption of this amendment, however, a motion 
to strike the entire proposal was introduced,106 thus provoking a de-
bate on the need for any women's property provision in the constitu-
tion.107 The arguments propounded against the amended proposal 
clearly demonstrate that the delegates did not perceive the provision 
as altering married women's contractual rights. Instead, a number 
of the proposal's opponents apparently obje~ted to the very concept 
of a married woman's separate estate.108 Delegate David Upton ar-
gued that "both the property of the man and the woman should be 
common property among their family."109 Delegate Richard Austin 
concurred, asking why it was "necessary to write this type of discrim-
ination for married women into the constitution."110 On the other 
hand, some delegates thought the provision was unnecessary be-
cause they thought that the married women's acts extended further 
than the proposed constitutional provision.111 
The supporters of the amended proposal focused on the im-
portance of providing constitutional protection for a married wom-
an's statutory right to maintain a separate estate free from liability 
104. See, e.g., CoNsTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 82, at 2438 (statement 
of Delegate J. Edward Hutchinson): 
Let me say this: frankly, at one time I was of the opinion that we didn't need 
to say anything at all about this in the constitution because, certainly, the legis-
lature by statute has gone further than the constitution went, and there is no 
doubt but what the legislature could provide all of this by statute law. But then 
-rll have to confess this-I became a little apprehensive and fearful lest, if the 
constitution is silent upon this matter, that not only the lady delegates in this 
convention would become aroused, but that perhaps a majority of the potential 
voters of the state, who are women, would become alarmed and not favor the 
work of this convention when, as a matter of fact, their rights really rest upon 
statute law and judge made law, and this constitutional provision is more or less 
declaratozy. However, yielding to the political practicalities of the situation and 
recognizing that from that standpoint we needed to say something, at that point 
I was ambitious to make it as broad as we could possibly make it. 
I think that if we write into the constitution that the disabilities of coverture 
are abolished, then the rights of a married woman will be the same as the rights 
of an unmarried woman, and she will be able to do evezything with her property 
that she could do if she were unmarried. At the same time I do not think that 
her privileges are denied her. By this provision she will gain all her rights and 
will not lose any of her special privileges. 
105. Id. at 2439 (statement of Delegate Ann Donnelly). 
106. Id. at 2439. 
107. Id. at 2439-43. 
108. Such arguments ignored, of course, the fact that the Married Women's Prop-
erty Act already guaranteed married women the right to a separate estate, See text 
at notes 34-36 supra. 
109. CoNSITroTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 82, at 2439. 
110. Id. at 2439. 
111. Id. at 2441. Delegate Mahinske seems to have passed over, as did the ini-
tial supporters of the amendment, the potentially broad impact of the first clause, 
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for her husband's debts. Rather than discussing the broad language 
of the provision's first sentence, they responded to the doubts about 
the necessity of a constitutional provision guaranteeing married 
women's extant statutory rights. Delegate Ann Donnelly declared: 
To say that married women do not need protection is to ignore the 
facts of life. 
. . . [l]t is very necessary that this be retained in the constitution 
because of the problems which are inherent in conveying property; 
whether they will mortgage or not; whether they will be liable for 
their husband's debts. 
. . . To remove any control from a married woman to protect her 
rights and her children's rights by knocking this language out and 
laughingly feeling that we have covered it in another article is, I 
think, very erroneous.112 
Delegate Katherine Cushman concurred: "The common law pro-
vides for a disadvantaged position for women, and there is no doubt 
in my mind that they need this type of protection."113 Some of the 
men supporting the proposal viewed it as necessary to protect mar-
ried women from their own frailties, the same rationale that under-
lay the early married women's acts. Delegate Joseph Snyder stated: 
I think that we have a responsibility as delegates to the convention to 
protect one of the most basic and fundamental divisions of American 
life-that is the family. I feel that as males and females, brother and 
sister delegates to this convention, we are obligated to put into this 
constitution something that will protect the focal center of family life, 
the woman. 
. . . I say this with all seriousness: that because of the makeup, 
the biological makeup of people, women are more trusting, and once 
the marriage vows are consummated, they are willing ,to share and 
share equally, and sometimes give away some of the rights that they 
have. And if they are not fully protected, there are those who would 
take advantage of this.114 
Other men offered their support for the amended proposal primarily 
out of deference to the women. Thus, even though one delegate 
believed the proposal to be unnecessary, he stated: "To me we do 
have to respect and honor the women. This is strictly for their pro-
tection, and I am willing to go along with it."115 Another delegate 
concluded: "[I]t seems like the women have won these things 
through years of work, and I think we should give it back to them 
and leave it in the constitution-at least, the original wording, the 
way it is in the present constitution."116 
112. Id. at 2440. 
113. Id. at 2443. 
114. Id. at 2440. 
115. Id. at 2443 (statement of Richard Kuhn). 
116. Id. at 2443 (statement of William Glover). 
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These statements by the proposal's backers indicate that their 
support stemmed from their desire to protect married women. They 
sought to preserve married women's separate estates and to insulate 
those estates from their husband's debts and the effects of their own 
trusting natures. The delegates concentrated upon the separate es-
tate provisions and generally ignored the effect of the first clause.117 
No consideration was given to the elimination of the remaining con-
tractual disabilities of married women. Thus, on the basis of the 
delegates' desire to conf~r constitutional protection to a married 
woman's separate estate, the motion to strike the entire proposal was 
defeated. 118 
The third step in the consideration of the provision began when 
a number of delegates reconsidered the new language, particularly 
the potentially far-reaching consequences of the first clause, and in-
troduced an amendment to resubstitute the language of the 1908 
constitution for the amended proposal.119 One delegate suggested 
that the change was important because "when we speak of the word 
'disabilities' with respect to the rights of married women, we should 
remember that these are not always things which are disadvanta-
geous to the ladies, even under the old strict common law."120 In 
support of this position, he quoted Blackstone's infamous passage: 
"These are the chief legal effects of marriage during the coverture; 
upon which we may observe, that even the disabilities which the wife 
lies under are for the most part intended for her protection and 
benefit: so great a favorite is the female sex of the laws of Eng-
land."121 
As a lone progressive voice, Delegate Milton Higgs protested 
against eliminating the amended proposal. Recognizing the pro-
posal's potential impact in expanding married women's rights, he ex-
horted the convention to overturn the old rule: 
[A] married woman has no right under the law of Michigan actually 
to enter into joint and several liability with her husband. If she signs 
a joint and several note, a judgment rendered would have to be re-
stricted to joint property ~nd it could not be a several liability on her 
117. A few delegates did focus on the potential impact of abolishing the disabil-
ities of coverture. See, e.g., id. at 2442 (statement of Melvin Nord) ("Everything 
that follows that first sentence, relates to property. But the first sentence seems to 
be much broader than that, and nobody has been able to give an exact statement 
of what the first sentence will do"), 2441 (statement of Edward Hutchinson) 
("[T]he rights accorded to married women by virtue of the married women's act are 
broader in scope than is the language of the present constitution, and the proposal 
now before you would abolish all of the disabilities of coverture and in that regard 
would be broader than the present married women's act"). 
118. Id. at 2443. 
119. Id. at 3001. 
120. Id. at 3002 (statement of Eugene Wanger). 
121. Id., quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES *445. 
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part. In other words, a married woman is prevented from applying 
her separate estate in this particular way. 
. . . [T]here have been so many statutory inroads toward reduc-
ing the disabilities of coverture that it would seem desirable to me 
that we should make this forthright statement that the disabilities of 
coverture are abolished, and actually give women a more complete 
unrestricted right to deal with their separate estate.122 
A majority of the convention, however, did not find these arguments 
persuasive and, when directly confronted with the proposal's poten-
tial impact, voted to accept the resubstitution of the 1908 lan-
guage.12a 
The final step in the consideration of the married women's prop-
erty provision occurred when an amendment was offered that essen-
tially reinstated the initial amended version of the provision. This 
new proposal was a result of the dissatisfaction of a number of dele-
gates with the mere restatement of the 1908 constitution's language, 
which did not even cover the entire Married Women's Property Act. 
It differed from the initial amended version in two ways: A new 
final sentence was added stating, "Dower may be relinquished or 
conveyed as provided by law," and the first sentence was modified 
to read, "The disabilities of coverture as to property are abol-
ished."124 In light of the numerous previous statements about the 
importance of guaranteeing to married women the right to their sep-
arate estates while still maintaining the protections of the married 
women's acts, it seems clear that the new language was, at the most, 
intended to incorporate the acts into the constitution.125 This con-
clusion is strongly supported by statements of many of the delegates. 
Delegate Stanley Everett remarked: 
[l]t is unlikely that the legislature would turn back the pages of his-
tory and put women back in that place, but we are doing 2 things: 
we are enunciating as a principle that these disabilities may never arise 
again in the state of Michigan, and we are affording those who have 
some questions about it that the legislature never can take this away. 
. . . [T]his is an historical declaration of women's freedoms and 
to many of us, at least, it is important that the constitution reiterate it 
and it would be harmful for us to take it out.126 
122. CoNSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 82, at 3002-03. 
123. Id. at 3003. 
124. Id. at 3149-50 (emphasis added). 
125. It is unclear whether the amended version was intended to include all three 
married women's acts in the constitution. The reference to property might mean that 
only section 1 of the 1855 Act dealing with a married woman's right to obtain 
and dispose of her separate estate is constitutionalized. The provision might also in-
clude, however, the contractual rights granted by section 4, since they cover contracts 
that relate to a married woman's separate estate. See statute cited in note 
34, supra. 
126. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 82, at 3150. 
,I 
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Another delegate added: "[11he first sentence now makes its 
meaning clear so that it will not affect anything except property."127 
Thus explained, the amendment was adopted128 and subsequently 
became article 10, section 1, of the new constitution.129 
The record of the constitutional convention demonstrates that the 
delegates, motivated by a perception that women generally, and 
married women in particular, required special legislative protection, 
were concerned with guaranteeing married women limited existing 
rights with relation to their separate estates rather than with granting 
them additional rights. Thus the new married women's property 
provision was intended to do no more than constitutionalize the pre-
existing statutory rights created by the Married Women's Property 
Act. The record also makes clear, however, that it was not the con-
vention's intent to constitutionalize the remaining common-law dis-
abilities. As Delegate Herman Dehnke stated: 
There isn't anything here whatever to suggest that this proposed 
amendment will be construed in any other way . . . [than] as a 
floor, as a limitation below which the legislature cannot go without 
any restriction on how much farther it may go in promoting the pur-
pose of the entire amendment . 
. . . We are merely raising the floor by what we are putting in 
here, and the legislature can build from there on.130 
Although after the adoption of the 1963 constitution married 
women in Michigan remained unable to bind their individual prop-
erty unless the contract related to their separate estate, the Michigan 
legislature retained the power to enact laws extending married wom-
en's contractual rights. 
No further laws affecting the contractual rights of married 
women were passed, however, until the enactment in 197 4 of the 
Michigan equal credit opportunity act.131 This act, which prohibits 
credit discrimination on the basis of sex or marital status, fails to 
eliminate expressly the remaining disabilities of coverture. How-
ever, these limitations upon married women's contractual rights are 
likely to have an adverse effect upon their ability to obtain credit. 
Thus, it is important to determine what effect the remaining con-
tractual disabilities have on the ability of married women to obtain 
credit, whether the disabilities conflict with the mandate of the new 
credit act, and, if conflicts do exist, how they should be resolved.182 
127. Id. at 3151 (statement of Delegate Herman Dehnke). 
128. Id. 
129. The final language is quoted in note 85 supra. 
130. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 82, at 2443. 
131. No. 246, [1974] Mich. Pub. & Local Acts - (codified at MICH. COMP. LAws 
ANN. § 750.147a (Supp. 1975) ), quoted in note 11 supra. 
132. It has been suggested that a married woman may be unable to contract for 
necessities since her husband may be liable for such contracts. Michigan Consumers 
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The existing limitations on a married woman's contractual rights 
can impair her attainment of equal credit opportunity by preventing 
her from, for example, acquiring credit on joint purchases with her 
husband, acting as a surety, or obtaining credit for a corporation in 
which she has an interest. 
The problem of a married woman seeking to obtain credit with 
her husband for a joint purchase is illustrated by City Finance Co. 
v. Kloostra, 133 the first case to give thorough consideration to the 
effect of the 1963 Michigan constitution on the remaining contrac-
tual disabilities of coverture. 134 Kloostra involved a suit by a finance 
company against a married woman who had co-signed a note with 
her husband to purchase an automobile. Before payments on the 
note had been completed, the couple was divorced and the husband 
departed with the car. The finance company then commenced suit 
against the wife. Ms. Kloostra sought to defend on the ground that 
the consideration did not relate to her separate estate and that, as 
a consequence, the judgment should be satisfied only from the 
property previously owned jointly by the couple.135 The trial judge, 
however, held that article 10, section 1, of the 1963 constitution had 
superseded the married women's acts with the result that Ms. Kloos-
tra was individually liable on the contract.136 On appeal, the third 
division of the Michigan court of appeals, rejecting this constitu-
tional analysis, determined that the reasons given by the supporters 
of the married women's property provision were "inconsistent with 
an intent to supersede the married women's property act."137 The 
court therefore held that a married woman could still assert the com-
mon law of coverture as a defense to a contract where the considera-
tion did not relate to her separate estate.138 . 
The analysis employed by the court in reaching this result is trou-
blesome. As has already been stated, the convention sought to limit 
the impact of the first clause of article 10, section 1, by adding the 
words "as to property" to ensure that the provision would not extend 
beyond the married women's acts. However, rather than finding a 
limitation in these words, the court distinguished between the dis-
abilities and the defenses of coverture. It stated that the inability 
Council, Women and Credit 7-8, Sept. 27, 1972. The Michigan supreme court, how-
ever, has held the purchase of necessities will bind a married woman's separate 
estate. See Hirshfield v. Waldron, 83 Mich. 116, 47 N.W. 239 (1890); Campbell 
v. White, 22 Mich. 178 (1871). See also Florer, supra note 38, at *103. 
133. 47 Mich. App. 276, 209 N.W.2d 498 (1973). 
134. But see Detroit Newspaper Indus. Credit Union v. McDonald, 9 Mich. App. 
146, 151, 156 N.W.2d 62, 65 (1967) (dictum). 
135. See MICH. CoMP. LAws § 557.53 (1970), quoted in note 74 supra. 
136. 47 Mich. App. at 277, 209 N.W.2d at 499. 
137. 47 Mich. App. at 285, 209 N.W.2d at 503. 
138. 47 Mich. App. at 288, 209 N.W.2d at 505. 
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of married women in Michigan to bind their separate estates unless 
the consideration relates to the separate estate was 
in reality, a "disability of coverture", for it exists only because the 
common law denied married women the capacity to make binding 
contracts and because our Legislature has not completely abrogated 
the common law. However, because the same incapacity can be 
used to avoid personal liability once a contract has been made, it is 
considered by many to be a "defense of coverture" and as such a pro-
tection for married women.139 
The court concluded that this distinction was essential to effect the 
intent of the constitutional convention to preserve the defenses of 
coverture as a protection for married women while abrogating cover-
ture's disabilities. 
The distinction between disabilities and defenses is, however, 
without support in Michigan case law. Although the Michigan su-
preme court has sometimes referred to the disabilities of coverture 
as defenses of coverture when the disability was asserted in defense 
to a suit, it has never been suggested that the two terms can be sepa-
rated and viewed as distinct concepts. The distinction also lacks any 
logical foundation. It appears that the court was suggesting that 
while a defense of coverture would enable a married woman to as-
sert her incapacity as a defense to a contract action, a disability of 
coverture would prevent her from suing on a contract for her own 
benefit by allowing the other party to assert her incapacity as a de-
fense. Thus, the only difference between a disability of coverture 
and a defense of coverture would be the time during the legal proc-
ess, and by whom, the married woman's contractual incapacity could 
be asserted. This distinction, however, begs the question: That a 
married woman cannot sue to enforce her contract is not the dis-
ability but rather merely one result of the disability. Moreover, 
elimination of one of the results of the disability does not abrogate 
the disability itself. The disability is thus not properly classified as 
a limitation on someone's defenses in court; instead, it is a limitation 
on the ability of a married woman to contract and bind herself in 
the first place. 
A further problem that the Kloostra court's distinction creates is 
that, by permitting the "defense of coverture" while abolishing the 
"disability," the contract would become in essence voidable at the 
option of the married woman. While a married woman could sue, 
she could not be sued absent her consent. Yet, if the contract were 
merely voidable, a married woman who was the maker of a negoti-
able instrument would be liable to a holder in due course notwith-
standing that the contract was not within the purview of the married 
139. 47 Mich. App. at 285, 209 N.W.2d at 503. 
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women's acts.140 Such a result would clearly contravene the court's 
apparent purpose to protect married women's estates from such ac-
tions.141 Finally, as a matter of fundamental policy, it is necessary 
to realize that the disabilities and defenses of coverture are inex-
tricably part of the same concept. In exchange for the "right'' to 
assert legal incapacity as a defense, married women must forgo the 
benefits resulting from the ability to bind themselves legally. By 
focusing on the illusory distinction between the disabilities and de-
fenses of coverture, the Kloostra court was able to avoid considera-
tion of the basic policies underlying the married women's acts. Thus, 
·the court failed to confront the essential question whether married 
women should be granted the contractual freedoms enjoyed by the 
rest of Michigan's adult population. 
Although the protective spirit of the Kloostra opinion may have 
resulted from the court's sympathy for the particular defendant's 
plight, such decisions can have profound effects on other married 
women seeking credit. Thus, a couple may seek to obtain credit 
jointly to purchase an item for which neither of their salaries is alone 
sufficient. Their combined income, however, may be enough to 
warrant the extension of credit. If both parties were unconstrained 
by contractual disabilities, the creditor would presumably be willing 
to grant credit to the couple on the basis of their joint and several 
liability. However, since a married woman could at any time deposit 
her earnings in a separate account, thus making them a part of her 
separate estate and insulating them from garnishment and attach-
ment, it is probable that a potential lender would greatly discount 
her income in computing the couple's available assets. Thus, in ex-
change for the protection offered by Kloostra, married women are 
likely to have their own incomes greatly discounted when applying 
for joint credit. Such· a situation seems to conflict with the clear 
mandate of the Michigan equal credit opportunity act. As a result 
of being a woman and married, a person would be denied her full 
contractual rights and responsibilities and, because of these contrac-
tual limitations, she may be denied credit. 
These existing contractual disabilities may also impede a married 
woman who seeks to become a surety. The married women's acts 
do not permit a married woman to bind her separate estate unless 
the obligation relates to her separate property.142 The leading 
140. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-305(b), MICH. COMP. LAWS § 440. 
3305 (1970), quoted in note 60 supra. 
141. Indeed, if the Kloostra court had followed through on the implications of 
its holding, Ms. K.Ioostra should have been liable on the note in issue. If the note 
was merely voidable, the finance company, as a holder in due course, should have 
had the right to sue. 
142. Nord, supra note 86, at 361. 
100 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 74:76 
Michigan case on the subject is DeVries v. Conklin.148 In consid-
eration for the discontinuation of the plaintiffs suit on a note made 
out to him by a husband, the husband and wife signed a new note. 
In a subsequent suit on the second note, the wife defended on the 
ground that no consideration related to her separate estate. The 
court held that the 1855 act "neither in its terms authorizes a mar-
ried woman to make herself liable personally for the debt of another, 
nor where no consideration moves to her can it be presumptively 
for her benefit. It was no part of the design of the statute to relieve 
her of common law disabilities for any such purpose."144 Since the 
imposition of liability upon a wife for her husband's debts was pre-
cisely the situation that the 1855 statute was intended to prevent, 
the court has been strict in its requirement that consideration relate 
to the married woman's separate estate.145 This disability, viewed 
as a protection for married women, has continued to be applied in 
the twentieth century.146 
This "protection" may have an adverse impact on married 
women in a number of ways. Even if a married woman decides that 
it is in her and her family's best interests to postpone the collection 
of her husband's debt by becoming a surety, the benefit to her sepa-
rate estate will not be considered direct enough to satisfy the statute. 
Since the law presumes that a married woman is incapable of ration-
ally calculating her own self-interests, it effectively makes the cal-
culation for her. 
A third situation in which a married woman in Michigan may 
be denied equal credit opportunity by her contractual disabilities is 
when she seeks to bind herself on a note for the benefit of a corpo-
ration in which she is a stockholder.147 This problem is exemplified 
by Russel v. People's Savings Bank,148 in which a married woman 
was a stockholder in a corporation that was indebted to a bank. To 
prevent consummation of suit by the bank, the woman signed the 
corporation's note as a surety. The Michigan supreme court, hold-
ing that the indirect benefits to the married woman's separate estate 
were not sufficient to bind her, stated that the woman "was not iden-
tified with the corporation otherwise than as having an interest in 
it; the legal identity of each was distinct, and contracts for the benefit 
of the corporate estate were in no sense contracts for the benefit of 
the estate of one of its corporators."149 The court has adhered to 
143. 22 Mich. 255 (1871). 
144. 22 Mich. at 259. 
145. See also West v. Laraway, 28 Mich. 464, 466 (1874). 
146. See Dowagiac Natl. Bank v. Maier, 285 Mich. I, 280 N.W. 86 ( 1938). 
147. See Honigman, supra note 78, at *269. 
148. 39 Mich. 671 (1878). 
149. 39 Mich. at 674. Accord, Fitzgerald v. Harry I. Garson Prod., 221 Mich. 
88, 90, 190 N.W. 695, 696 (1922). 
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this interpretation even in cases where the interest of the married 
woman in the corporation's finances was substantial. Thus, in Kirby 
v. Orloff, 150 where a married woman was the principal stockholder, 
treasurer, and a large creditor of a corporation, the court refused 
to enforce a personal note that she had executed to cover a dishon-
ored corporate check. Despite the woman's obvious financial inter-
est in the corporation, the court held: "[W]hen she contracted to 
pay the debts of the corporation she was not dealing with reference 
to her separate estate. Though she may have been indirectly bene-
fited as a stockholder, she received no consideration affecting her 
individual estate."151 Similarly, in Koengeter v. Holzbaugh,152 the 
court held that even when a married woman was the sole stockholder 
of a corporation, she could not be liable since no consideration re-
lated to her separate estate. Since creditors of small corporations 
often demand that corporate officers assume a personal obligation 
on corporate notes, 153 female entrepreneurs may encounter signifi-
cant difficulties in obtaining credit for their corporations. Over fifty 
years ago, the Michigan supreme court recognized that "[m]arried 
women are now so frequently engaged in partnership and corporate 
business ventures that it may be desirable to further remove the dis-
ability created by the common law, but such an action must be taken 
by the legislature and not by the courts."154 Yet, because the Mich-
igan legislature has failed to enact such legislation, married women 
remain unable to obtain equal credit in the corporate context, de-
spite the fact that, as one commentator has pointed out, "experience 
in the overwhelming majority of states that have removed the wife's 
disability to act as her husband's or a third party's surety or guarantor 
does not reveal the rise of any special problems or abuse."155 
It appears certain that these effects of the limitations upon mar-
ried women's contractual rights will compel lenders in numerous 
cases to deny credit to married women, who are unable to bind 
themselves contractually to certain types of obligations. Although 
it might be argued that this result-credit discrimination because 
of one party's sex and marital status-is not expressly proscribed by 
150. 226 Mich. 413, 197 N.W. 371 (1924). 
151. 226 Mich. at 416, 197 N.W. at 372. 
152. 332 Mich. 280, 50 N.W.2d 778 (1952). 
153. J. WHITB & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
§ 13-4, at 405 (1972). 
154. Fitzgerald v. Harry I. Garson Prod., 221 Mich. 88, 91; 190 N.W. 695, 696 
(1922). 
155. L. KANowrrz, supra note 12, at 58. Even if the abrogation of all married 
women's contractual disabilities does result in some problems, they "may be dealt 
with by many devices short of restricting the wife's contractual capacity." Id. at 58. 
For example, traditional contract principles that prevent overreaching in the bargain-
ing process could be applied without assuming that a married woman lacks the capac-
ity to make decisions for herself. 
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the equal credit opportunity act because the credit goes not to the 
woman directly but, for example, to the note's principal, such an ar-
gument is untenable for two reasons. First, the denial of a married 
woman's right to be a surety or to assume liability when the consid-
eration goes to her corporation is a denial of credit to her since she 
is denied the opportunity to assume the obligation. Although this 
may represent an expansive reading of the term credit, it is not in-
consistent with the broadly remedial nature of the new credit act. 
Second, even if one defines the grant of credit narrowly to mean 
the actual dispensation of funds, the language of the credit act does 
not specifically require that the proscribed discrimination result in 
the denial of credit to any particular person. It merely states that 
"[a] person shall not discriminate in extending credit or granting 
a loan on the basis of ... marital status [or] sex .... "160 Thus, 
in refusing to extend credit to a corporation because its sole stockhold-
er is a married woman who cannot assume personal liability on a note, 
a lender would be denying credit to the corporation on the basis of 
sex and marital status. Since the act does not specify upon whose 
sex or marital status the proscribed discrimination must be based, 
it should not be interpreted as prohibiting credit discrimination only 
when the direct recipient of the funds is the person discriminated 
against. All that should be required is a direct causal link between 
the denial of credit and the sex or marital status of some party. 
Thus, it appears that a conflict exists between the credit act and 
the requirement of the married women's acts that consideration must 
go to a married woman's separate estate to make her contract bind-
ing.157 This conflict necessitates a determination of the effect of the 
156. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN.§ 750.147a(l) (Supp. 1975). 
157. Another barrier to full equal credit opportunity is the difficulty a housewife 
has in accumulating a separate estate and thus establishing a credit rating in 
her own name. Under Michigan common law, the husband is the head of the family, 
People v. Sybisloo, 216 Mich. 1, 184 N.W. 416 (1921), and is responsible for the 
support of his wife. Howe v. North, 69 Mich. 272, 37 N.W. 213 (1888). In ex-
change for his duty of support, the wife owes to her husband her services in the 
home. The wife has no legal right to recover money for any services she renders 
in the home. Sorenson v. Sorenson, 211 Mich. 429, 179 N.W. 256 (1920). Cf. text 
at note 67 supra. Thus, a contract for such payments is void both for lack of con-
sideration and as a violation of public policy. Michigan Trust Co. v. Chapin, 106 
Mich. 384, 386, 64 N.W. 334, at 334 (1895); Detroit & Security Trust Co. v. Gitre, 
254 Mich. 66, 74, 235 N.W. 884, 887 (1931). 
These rules, which specifically prevent a housewife from accumulating the kind 
of income that would allow her to obtain credit in her own name, run counter to 
at least the spirit of the equal credit opportunity act. They do not directly prevent 
the granting of equal credit, but their effect impedes the underlying function of the 
act. Thus, although it would perhaps be going too far to suggest that the credit act 
works a change in the complex law of marital property, the conflict does suggest that 
the legislature should give serious consideration to restructuring Michigan's marital 
property laws and the law of support to effect the principle of equality that has been 
adopted in the equal credit opportunity act. In addition, the Michigan legislature 
has ratified the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) to the U.S. Constitution. House 
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credit act on the remaining disabilities of coverture. As a general 
rule, the Michigan supreme court has declared that, in determining 
the meaning of a statute, "it is the primary duty of the court to 
ascertain, if possible, the intention of the legislature in passing it. 
That intention is to be drawn from an examination of the language 
of the act itself, the subject-matter under consideration, · and the 
scope and purpose of the act."158 It has emphasized that although 
the legislative intention should be ascertained from the language of 
the act itself, "[t]he spirit and intention of the statute should prevail 
over its strict letter."159 Thus, the court may consider the occasion 
for the statute's enactment in ascertaining the underlying purpose 
of the act. 160 The court has also established some specialized rules 
of statutory construction: "Where a statute attempts, in derogation 
of the common law, to create a liability, we cannot go beyond the 
clearly-expressed provisions of the act. Such statutes are not to be 
extended or enlarged in their scope by construction."161 Thus, 
where a statute is penal in nature, creates a right of action not rec-
ognized at common law, or is in derogation of other common-law 
rights, it will generally be strictly construed.162 On the other hand, 
the Michigan court has suggested: "When called upon to interpret 
social legislation, this Court has sought construction which accorded 
both with legislative intent and the stated remedial purpose of the 
act in question."163 The court's policy is therefore to interpret re-
medial statutes liberally: 164 "A remedial statute is designed to cor-
rect an existing law, redress an existing grievance, or introduce regu-
lations conducive to the public good. . . . Such statutes are to be 
liberally construed."165 
Joint Resolution LLL, 1972 JoURNAL OF nm HousB OF RBPRESENTATIVBS OF nm 
STATB OF MICHIGAN 1815 (May 18, 1972); Senate Joint Resolution GG, 1972 JouR-
NAL OF TIIB SENATE OF nm STATB OF MICHIGAN 1217 (May 22, 1972). Adoption 
of the ERA would require the state to restructure its laws governing the marital rela-
tion since the sex-based classifications that are now so deeply imbedded in Michigan's 
family law would no longer be permissible. See Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, 
The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 
80 YALB L.J. 872, 936-54 (1971). 
158. In re School Dist. No. 6, 284 Mich. 132, 143, 278 N.W. 792 (1938). See 
Ballinger v. Smith, 328 Mich. 23, 30, 43 N.W.2d 49, 53 (1950). 
159. Smith v. City Commn., 281 Mich. 235,241,274 N.W. 776, 778 (1937). 
160. Bennett v. Michigan Pulpwood Co., 181 Mich. 33, 40, 147 N.W. 490, 492 
(1914); Caldwell v. Ward, 83 Mich. 13, 16, 46 N.W. 1024, 1025 (1890). 
161. City of Detroit v. Putnam, 45 Mich. 263, 265, 7 N.W. 815, 816 (1881). 
162. Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80, 75 N.W. 287 (1898); Risser v. Hoyt, 
53 Mich. 185, 192, 18 N.W. 611, 615 (1884). 
163. Gauthier v. Campbell, Wyant & Cannon Foundry Co., 360 Mich. 510, 527, 
104 N.W.2d 182, 190 (1960). 
164. See Oakland County Treasurer v. Auditor General, 292 Mich. 58, 290 N.W. 
327 (1940). 
165. In re School Dist. No. 6, 284 Mich. 132, 144,278 N.W. 792, 797 (1938). 
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The equal credit act seems to be both a penal statute and a re-
medial statute. It is penal to the extent that it grants a cause of 
action against creditors that previously was not recognized. Yet, it 
is remedial in that it grants expanded rights to women. Faced with 
a similar conflict, the Michigan court has held: "A liberal construc-
tion for the purpose of the remedy may be indulged, but to the ex-
tent that it operates against the offender it must be construed 
strictly."166 Therefore, in determining the effect of the act on mar-
ried women's contractual rights, it should be construed liberally to 
effect its essential purpose-to assure all persons the right to equal 
credit opportunity. The language of the Michigan supreme court 
in an early case interpreting the Married Women's Act of 1855 is 
instructive in this regard: "[T}he statutes on this subject . . . are 
to be construed with a view to give them the effect designed by 
the legislature, rather than with an effort to retain as much as possi-
ble of an old system which they were meant to displace."167 
In order, therefore, to give the act the "effect designed by the 
legislature," it is necessary to infer the implied repeal of the remain-
ing contractual disabilities of coverture.rns The act's language dem-
onstrates clearly that the legislature sought to ensure that married 
women would be afforded equal opportunity to obtain credit. Strict 
enforcement of both the common-law rules that prevent a married 
woman from contracting unless the consideration relates directly to 
her separate estate and the equal credit mandate of the new Michi-
gan credit law would force lenders to grant credit to women from 
whom they could not obtain judgments. Certainly it was not the in-
tent of the legislature to place lenders in such a predicament. In 
order to effectuate the legislative intent to ensure equality of credit 
opportunity, it is necessary to establish contractual equality. Thus, 
the intent to grant married women the right to contract even when 
the consideration does not relate to their separate estates must be 
inferred from the legislature's actions.169 
166. Robinson v. Harmon, 157 Mich. 276, 278, 122 N.W. 106, 107 (1909). 
167. Tillman v. Shackleton, 15 Mich. 447, 457 (1867). Cf. DeVries v. Conklin, 
22 Mich. 255 (1871). 
168. The legislature has the power to eliminate the remaining disabilities of 
coverture. See text at note 130 supra. 
169. The Michigan court has been willing to imply a repeal of certain contractual 
disabilities without an explicit legislative mandate. See Wolcott v. Patterson, 100 
Mich. 227, 58 N.W. 1006 (1894), in which a married woman was held liable on 
a contract for an attorney's services in a divorce case. Married women were au-
thorized by statute to bring such suits, and the court found "the right to contract 
for such services is necessarily incident to and included in her right to bring suit." 
100 Mich. at 299, 58 N.W. at 1007. 
In addition, it should be noted that the equal credit bill was introduced soon after 
the Kloostra decision, and that case was brought to the attention of the legislators. 
Thus, it appears likely that the legislature was aware of the case's implications for 
married women seeking credit and that in passing the credit bill the legislature sought 
to reverse the case's effect. 
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Further support for the inference that the Michigan legislature 
intended to abrogate the remaining disabilities of coverture can be 
found in its ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment. 170 The 
amendment, which requires equal treatment of both sexes, would, 
if adopted, eliminate any extant disabilities of coverture. The 
fundamental inconsistency between the ratification of this amend-
ment and retention of the contractual disabilities of coverture rein-
forces the conclusion that, when enacting the equal credit opportu-
nity act, the Michigan legislature did not intend to preserve the dis-
abilities. 
Although this Note has focused on how the courts should resolve 
the conflict between the new equal credit opportunity law and the 
remaining disabilities of coverture, the issue is not necessarily one 
for the judiciary alone. The legislature should expressly guarantee 
that all married women have legal rights equal to those of men and 
single women. The Michigan legislature, by approving the Equal 
Rights Amendment, has already demonstrated its support for end-
ing outmoded legislation based on the patronizing notion that, be-
cause of "[t]he natural and proper timidity and delicacy which be-
longs to the female sex,"171 married women must be discriminated 
against for their own protection. It is time for the legislature to act 
to ensure that married women are no longer denied the- rights ac-
corded the rest of adult society. 
170. See note 157 supra. 
171. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring). 
